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A CURRENT PROBLEM OF NATURALIZATION
A LIENS have no right inherent or statutory, to be admitted to
membership in the body politic of the United States of America.
Naturalization, then, being solely and entirely a political privilege ex-
tended by sovereign grace to aliens resident within the United States,
Congress has undoubted authority under the Constitution to prescribe
the terms and conditions upon which such privilege shall be granted.'
While Congress, in dealing with the naturalization problem, recog-
nized it to be impolitic to perpetuate the character of alien any longer
than was absolutely necessary, that law making body still recognized
that a reasonable probationary term should be prescribed to enable
candidates to rid themselves of foreign and to acquire American at-
tachments, to learn the principles and imbibe the spirit of our govern-
ment, and to admit of a probability, at least, of their feeling a real
interest in our affairs. A residence of not less than five years was,
therefore, required of an alien before he might petition for citizenship,
this to accommodate the feelings of the candidate to the manners, laws
and government of this country.
2
Since the status of citizenship involves reciprocal obligations between
state and citizen, it ought in fairness and in compensation for such
obligations to be beneficial as well to the state as to the person who
seeks citizenship. To this end, the proofs exacted from the applicant,
and the status and condition of the applicant, which these proofs dis-
close, ought to be considered in the light of what such status and condi-
tions promise to the government for the future, and with only negligible
regard for the past.3 While the antecedent character of the applicant
and his reputation and acts in the past are persuasive, as aiding the as-
sumption of continuance upon a good course, yet the government is
entitled, before it receives him, and before it assumes the obligation
to protect him as a citizen, to consider whether the burdens entailed,
will not be so much greater than the benefits accruing to it as to make the
naturalization of the applicant a bad or dangerous bargain, and a
bargain utterly unfair to its other millions of citizens. Thus, where
an applicant had left his wife and children in Russia in 19T3 and had
Ex. p. Eberhardt, 270 Fed. 334; In re Tomnarchlio, 269 Fed. 334; In re Sigel-
man, 268 Fed. 217.
See. 2,70, U. S. Rev. Stat., and see In re Vaskek, 271 Fed. 326.
'Lucia v. United States, 231 U. S. 23, 34 Sup. Ct. IO.
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not been able to communicate with them for a period of seven years,
his petition was denied where it appeared that he sought citizenship
mainly for the purpose of returning to Russia under the protection
of the American flag in order to get his family and bring them to this
country, and it fufther appeared that he secured service on his repre-
sentation that his wife and children were "mainly dependent on his
labor for support." The court, however, said it did not particularly
stress the latter point, and it principally emphasized the fact that the
benefits which the country would receive were entirely incommensurate
with the obligations it would incur by reason of possible foreign
complications.'
Since the late World War, the question has constantly arisen as
to the status of that class of people designated as enemy aliens.
Section 2171 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides
that: "No alien who is a native citizen or subject, or a denizen of
any country, state, or sovereignty, with which the United States are
at war, at the time of his application, shall be then admitted to be-
come a citizen of the United States." In time of peace this section,
of course, is unimportant. The first application of the section during
the war occurred where the applicant, had long before April 6, 1917,
declared his intention of becoming a citizen, and on the date of the
declaration of a state of war between the United States and Germany,
made application to be admitted to citizenship. The court held that
since he was a German subject, he came within the section above quoted
and he could not be admitted. His application was not denied, however,
but was merely postponed until the close of the war.5
The Draft Act subjected to draft for military service all resident
aliens of the prescribed age who had declared their intention of be-
coming citizens of the United States.' It was subsequently amended
to provide that an alien might be relieved from military service by
withdrawing his declaration of intention, in which event he was for-
ever barred from becoming a citizen.' Many aliens, both declarant
and non-declarant, claimed exemption from the draft, and such exemp-
tions were frequently granted declarant aliens contrary to the presi-
dential regulations. These claims for exemption have been a constant
source of controversy in connection with the naturalization of aliens
who made such claims.
'In re Sigelman, 268 Fed. 217.
'Matter of Meyer, ioo Misc. (N. Y.) 587 (1917).
'Comp. Stat., I918, 1919, Supp. Sec. 2044b.
'Comp. Stat. igg, Supp. Sec. Io563e.
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The courts have taken three positions with reference to such aliens:
(i) that they were forever barred from naturalization; (2) that prior
declarations of intentions by them were invalidated, but that after
the statutory period of five years, they would be eligible to citizenship;
(3) that their naturalization was not substantially affected.
Although the authorities are clear that in the absence of specific
legislation, no naturalization court can forever bar an alien from
citizenship,8 this was done in a number of unreported cases.9 In one
instance, an order forever barring an alien from naturalization was
amended and the alien merely required to serve the probationary term
of five years.'* Whether the bar was declared to be permanent, or,
as in most cases, for a period of five years only, the reasoning of the
court was the same: viz., that by his claim for exemption, the alien
shirked his duties and showed that he was not attached to the Constitu-
tion, nor loyal to the United States."
The Naturalization Law requires the applicant to establish that he
has behaved "as a man of good moral character, attached to the prin-
ciples of the Constitution" for the five years immediately preceding his
petition. The decisions holding aliens who have claimed exemption
ineligible for five years measures that period either from the time the
claim was made,' 2 or from the date of the Armistice.'
There are fewer recorded opinions holding that aliens were not
disqualified for naturalization by claiming exemption under the draft.
In one of the earliest decisions, the court ruled that under the Selective
Service Law, Secs. 2, 4 (Comp. Stat. i9I9, Secs. 2o44f, 2o44d) and
the selective service regulations wholly excluding alien enemies from
military service, an alien enemy's claim of exemption on the ground
of alienage did not show that he was unattached to the principles of
the Constitution and well disposed to the good order and happiness of
the country as required by the Naturalization Law of June 29, 19o6,
'State v. District Court, 202 P. 387 (1921) ; In re Conti, 217 Fed. 833; In re
Guliano, 156 Fed. 42o.
*American Civil Liberties Union-Bulletin No. 23.
"In re Lindner, 292 Fed. iooi.
'In re Leon, 262 Fed. 66, where the court said: "Any person unwilling
to pledge his hands, his heart, his life, to the service of the government of
the United States, first and always, is unworthy to be admitted to citizenship."
See also, In re SilberschutS, 269 Fed. 398; In re Toinarchio, 269 Fed. 4oo; In re
Trachsel, 271 Fed. 779; In re Rubin, 272 Fed. 697; In re Shanin, 278 Fed. 739;
In re Pitto, etc., 293 Fed. 2oo; In re Lindner, 292 Fed. iooi; In re Penelacqua,
295 Fed. 862.
"In re Pitto, etc., 293 Fed. 200.
'In re Lindner, 292 Fed. 1ooi.
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Sec. 4 (Comp. Stat. Sec. 4352), since the mere claim of an exemption
established by law, was not an act of disloyalty.1
In re SienW5 decided November 27, 1922, was the earliest recorded
case in which the application for naturalization of a non-enemy declarant
who had claimed exemption was granted. The claim of Siem, a
Norwegian, for exemption had been denied and Siem classified as A-i,
but he was later rejected for physical disabilities and rendered non-
combatant service in the copper mines. The court held that the obliga-
tion of military service attached to citizenship and that no duty to
render such service rested upon a resident alien, even though he had
declared his intention to become a citizen. Until he became a full
citizen his allegiance to his native country persisted, and he could not be
compelled to render military service to the United States without
violation of international law. In such circumstances, his claim to
exemption was only patriotism to Norway, a neutral country, which
gave promise of his being in the future a better citizen of this country,
and was no indication that he was not attached to the principles of
the American Constitution.
The latest and best reasoned opinion on this point is found in a
case but recently decided by Judge Geiger in the District Court of
Wisconsin,"- wherein the government's objections to the naturalization
of (i) enemy aliens, declarant and non-declarant; (2) declarant non-
enemy aliens, and (3) non-declarant non-enemy aliens who had claimed
exemption from the draft, were all overruled. The opinion holds that
in view of the fact that whether or not an alien was liable to the
draft dependent on his status: viz., whether alien or non-alien, de-
clarant or non-declarant, he should not be penalized for making either
a tenable or untenable claim to exemption, even where such claim was,
as often happened, allowed. Judge Geiger concluded from the develop-
ments of the situation, that the whole matter of pressing the Draft
Law against an alien status was believed to be open to fair, if not
grave, debate. The court points out that it was mandatory for the
administrators of the Draft Law to exclude all enemy aliens from ser-
" In re Miegel, 272 Fed. 688. The court further ruled that a claim of exemp.
tion from military service under the Selective Service Law by an alien, not an
enemy, who had declared his intention to become a citizen, and who was not en-
titled to the exemption claimed, indicated that he was not attached to the prin-
ciples of the Constitution, and that a five year probationary period was necessary
before admittance could be sought.
'284 Fed. 868. This decision was later affirmed when the government sought
to cancel the certificate of naturalization granted. United States v. Siem, 299
Fed. 582.
"'fit re Naturalieation of Aliens, etc., I Fed. (2nd) 594.
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vice, regardless of whether any exemption was claimed on the part of
such alien. The court asks:
"Why were aliens, who, under the law, were subject to nothing but
peremptory exclusion, asked whether they claimed exemption, when,
under the law, a negative answer still left them nothing but exclu-
sion? .... .shall we conclude that the administrative boards, also
advisory boards, consisting largely of members of the legal profession,
deliberately committed themselves to exacting futile answers respecting
untenable claims-either for or against uillingness to serve-with the
idea that such answers might serve to block naturalization?"
The court took cognizance of the other decisions and shows how the
government was confronted at once with the question of whether the
probationary period was to run from the time exemption was claimed,
from the date of the Armistice or from the date of the final treaty
of peace. Says the judge. "I have no doubt that the gdvernment must
realize the incongruity of its position. Plainly, if such is the law, it
puts aliens who really desired to avoid service in no severer task than
making a choice between going to war and deferring their naturaliza-
tion."
Upon a comparison of the conflicting authorities, the more persuasive
conclusion is that claims for exemption unconnected with any other
manifestation of disloyalty, should not affect an application for na-
turalization. The courts seem gradually to be coming to this conclusion,
and in the words of Judge Bourquin:
"As the war and its emotions recede, it is interesting to note that
the earliest of said decisions denied admission 'with prejudice'; the
later, without this futile excommunication; the latest, with express leave
to renew; and now in the instant proceedings with its decision granting
admission. "17
J. M. O'BRIEN.
1 In re Siew, 284 Fed. 868 at page 869.
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